Working Paper Series, Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School
No 1999-10:
CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange
Robert Neumann and Torben Voetmann
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between performance
and CEO turnovers using
a sample of 81 turnovers and 81 matching
companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock
Exchange. We find that poor
performance increases the probability of management
replacements and
that forced layoffs are value-increasing events while voluntary
resignations are value-decreasing events. Institutional investors as active
monitors, or
part of corporate control, are not exhibited in the
analysis of CEO turnovers. If
institutional investors have any
influence on CEO turnovers, then it is not revealed in
our data. But,
the results suggest that institutional investors' equity holdings tend to
protect managers from replacement.
Keywords: CEO Turnovers; Corporate Governance; Ownership Structure; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: G14; G23; G32; (follow links to similar papers)
34 pages, May 17, 2001
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