Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School
No 02-2008:
Equilibrium Selection with Risk Dominance in a Multiple-unit Unit Price Auction
Anette Boom
Abstract: This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing
procedure, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to
discriminate between two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of
the same type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit
price auction where two sellers compete in order to serve a fixed demand.
The equilibria where the firm with the larger capacity bids the maximum
price, serves the residual demand and is undercut by the low capacity firm
that sells its total capacity risk dominate the equilibria where the roles
are interchanged.
Keywords: na; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: G10; (follow links to similar papers)
12 pages, January 1, 2008
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
copyright.
Download GhostScript
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Downloadable files:
7664 
Download Statistics
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lars Nondal ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Programing by
Design Joakim Ekebom
