European Business Schools Librarian's Group
ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School
No DR 06005: Transferts des migrants et offre de travail dans un modèle de signalisation
Claire Naiditch () and Radu Vranceanu ()
Additional contact information
Claire Naiditch: École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique, Postal: 3, avenue Pierre Larousse , 92245 MALAKOFF Cedex, FRANCE
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex , FRANCE
Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of migrant remittances on the supply of labour of beneficiaries in a developing country. The model is cast as a two period game between a resident and an altruistic migrant, under imperfect information of the latter about the true economic situation of the former. The game presents a Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium where at least some residents subject to a good economic situation would behave as if they were disadvantaged, only to manipulate donor's expectations. In some specific circumstances, the resident affected by the bad state of the world may undertake a costly signalling strategy.
Keywords: Development; Labor Supply; Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium; Remittances; Signaling
29 pages, April 2006
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