SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 248:
Delegation of Bargaining and Power
Björn Segendorff
Abstract: Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and
decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to
bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to
decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium
the principals delegate to agents that are relatively disinterested in the
public good and give them all power. The fact that both principals have the
possibility to delegate is, in equilibrium, harmful to at least one of
them. The equilibrium may even be Pareto dominated by the outcome under
autarchy.
Keywords: Strategic delegation; bargaining; disagreement; power.; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C71; C72; (follow links to similar papers)
20 pages, August 31, 1998
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