SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
No 682:
The Fetters of the Sib: Weber Meets Darwin
Ingela Alger ()
and Jörgen Weibull ()
Abstract: We analyze the effects of family ties on the incentives
for productive effort. A family is modelled as a pair of altruistic
siblings. Each sibling exerts effort to produce output under uncertainty
and siblings may transfer output to each other. We show that altruism has a
non-monotonic effect on effort. We study how this effect depends on
"climate," the magnitude and volatility of returns to effort. We also
analyze the evolutionary robustness of family ties and how this robustness
depends on climate. We find that family ties will be stronger in milder
climates than in harsher climates.
Keywords: altruism; family ties; moral hazard; evolutionary robustness; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D02; D13; (follow links to similar papers)
41 pages, November 13, 2007
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