Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris
Aggregation of Coarse Preferences
Abstract: We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n
alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement l<n if it first
partitions An into l subsets of tied alternatives, and then ranks these
subsets within a linear ordering. When l < n, preferences are coarse. It is
shown that, if the refinement of preferences does not exceed l, a super
majority rule with rate 1-1/l is necessary and sufficient to rule out
Condorcet cycles of any length. It is argued moreover how the coarser the
individual preferences, (1) the smaller the rate of super majority
necessary to rule out cycles in probability (2) the more probable the
pairwise comparisons of alternatives, for any given super majority rule.
Keywords: individual preferences; voting rules; aggregation; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C50; D90; (follow links to similar papers)
23 pages, November 26, 1998
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