European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Home About Series Subject/JEL codes Advanced Search
HEC Paris. Research Department Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris

No 659:
Aggregation of Coarse Preferences

CRES Hervé

Abstract: We consider weak preference orderings over a set An of n alternatives. An individual preference is of refinement l<n if it first partitions An into l subsets of tied alternatives, and then ranks these subsets within a linear ordering. When l < n, preferences are coarse. It is shown that, if the refinement of preferences does not exceed l, a super majority rule with rate 1-1/l is necessary and sufficient to rule out Condorcet cycles of any length. It is argued moreover how the coarser the individual preferences, (1) the smaller the rate of super majority necessary to rule out cycles in probability (2) the more probable the pairwise comparisons of alternatives, for any given super majority rule.

Keywords: individual preferences; voting rules; aggregation; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C50; D90; (follow links to similar papers)

23 pages, November 26, 1998

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

97aa48bd41125ce12f7f82e5e8dda6e9.pdf    PDF-file
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Sandra Dupouy ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design Joakim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0659 This page was generated on 2014-12-14 17:56:14