Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris
Herve CRES and Mich TVEDE
Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets
Abstract: An economy with two dates is considered, on state at the
first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders
determine production plans b voting -one share, one vote- and at r-majority
stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most
rx100 percent of the shareholders.
Keywords: general equilibrium; incomplete markets; firms; voting; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D21; D52; D71; G39; (follow links to similar papers)
27 pages, February 1, 2001
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