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Continuous-Time Games of Timing
(), LARAKI Rida
() and SOLAN Eilon
Abstract: We address the question of existence of equilibrium in
general timing games of complete information. Under weak assumptions, any
two-player timing game has a subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e > 0.
This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games
with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.
Keywords: Timing games; war of attrition; preemption games; subgame perfect equilibrium; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; C73; (follow links to similar papers)
36 pages, January 3, 2003
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