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Linkage principle, Multi-dimensional Signals and Blind Auctions
() and LOVO Stefano
Abstract: We compare the seller’s expected revenue in a second price
sealed bid auction for a single object in which bidders receive
multidimensional signals. Bidders’ valuations for the object depend on
their signals and a signal observed privately by the seller. We show in
various examples that the seller can be better off not revealing publicly
his signal. Hence the linkage principle does not necessarily hold when
bidders receive multidimensional signals.
Keywords: Auction Theory; Linkage Principle; Multidimensional Signals; Blind Auctions; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D44; (follow links to similar papers)
10 pages, August 1, 2003
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