Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris
Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information
() and Johanes HÖRNER
Abstract: In this paper, the authors define belief-free equilibria
in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria
for which players’ continuation strategies are best-replies, after every
history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. They
characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium
payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a
belief-free equilibrium payoff.
Keywords: game theory; equilibria; information; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; C73; (follow links to similar papers)
31 pages, May 1, 2006
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