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No 884:
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information

LOVO Stefano ()

Abstract: We de ne belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as se- quential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payo s that includes all belief-free equilibrium payo s. Conversely, any payo in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payo

Keywords: repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; belief-free equilibria; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C72; C73; (follow links to similar papers)

31 pages, December 1, 2007

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