Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information
Abstract: We de ne belief-free equilibria in two-player games with
incomplete information as se- quential equilibria for which players'
continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history,
independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a
set of payos that includes all belief-free equilibrium payos. Conversely,
any payo in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payo
Keywords: repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; belief-free equilibria; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72; C73; (follow links to similar papers)
31 pages, December 1, 2007
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Design Joakim Ekebom