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No 921:
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence

Stefano Lovo (), Tristan Tomala () and Johannes Hörner ()

Abstract: In this paper, the authors characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.

Keywords: repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; belief-free equilibria; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C72; C73; (follow links to similar papers)

79 pages, October 10, 2009

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