Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris
Do countries falsify economic date strategically? Some evidence that they do
() and Gilles Stoltz
Abstract: The authors find evidence supporting the hypothesis that
countries at times misreport their eco-nomic data in a strategic manner.
Among those suspected are countries with xed exchange rate regimes, high
negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances,
which corroborates the intuition developed with a simple economic model.
They also find that countries with bad institutional quality rankings and
those in Africa, Middle East, Eastern Europe and Latin America release
economic data of questionable veracity. Their evidence calls for models
with public signals to consider strategic misinformation and for
establishing inde- pendent statistical agencies to assure the delivery of
high quality economic data.
Keywords: capital flows; public information provision; misinformation; Benford's law; transparency; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D82; F31; F32; F33; F34; (follow links to similar papers)
59 pages, April 27, 2010
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