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An interpretive account of logical aggregation theory
() and Franz Dietrich
Abstract: Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of
it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by
having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of
merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sagerís
doctrinal paradox and Pettitís discursive dilemma, two problems that we
distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the
discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final aim of
the paper is to give the latter its own theoretical development, along the
lines of Dietrich and Monginís recent technical work. However, the paper
also aims at reviewing the main existing results, starting from the first
impossibility theorem proved by List and Pettit. It provides a uniform
logical framework in which the whole of theory can be stated and its
theorems can be compared with each other.
The account goes through three
historical steps: the scattered early results on the independence axiom,
the collective achievement of the canonical theorem which provided the
theory with its specific method of analysis; and finally the recent
extension mentioned above to the doctrinal paradox.
Keywords: Judgment Aggregation; Logical Aggregation; Doctrinal Paradox; Discursive Dilemma; General Logic; Premiss-Based vs Conclusion-Based Approach; Social Choice Theory; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D70; D71; D79; (follow links to similar papers)
48 pages, February 1, 2011
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