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Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games
(), Eilon Solan
() and Nicolas Vieille
Abstract: We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games,
where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed
by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we provide a simple characterization
of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as players become very patient.
Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the Markov chain only
through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are the
feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the
receiver, and an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.
Keywords: sender-receiver; dynamic games; bayesian games; communication; repeated games; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C73; D83; (follow links to similar papers)
44 pages, September 15, 2012
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