Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris
Strategic Information Exchange
(), Eilon Solan
() and Nicolas Vieille
Abstract: We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with
two-sided incomplete information. In effect, two players are facing
independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is
potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how,
information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one’s
initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at
which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high
rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.
Keywords: Strategic Information Exchange; incomplete information; independent decision problems; equilibrium; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C00; (follow links to similar papers)
49 pages, October 24, 2013
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