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No 1009:
Strategic Information Exchange

Dinah Rosenberg (), Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()

Abstract: We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In effect, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one’s initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.

Keywords: Strategic Information Exchange; incomplete information; independent decision problems; equilibrium; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C00; (follow links to similar papers)

49 pages, October 24, 2013

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