Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris
Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games
() and Tristan Tomala
Abstract: We introduce the model of Stochastic Revision Games where
a finite set of players control a state variable and receive payoffs as a
function of the state at a terminal deadline. There is a Poisson clock
which dictates when players are called to choose of revise their actions.
This paper studies the existence of Markov perfect equilibria in those
games. We give an existence proof assuming some form of correlation.
Keywords: Stochastic Revision Games; Games Theory; Equilibria; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C73; (follow links to similar papers)
32 pages, September 1, 2015
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