European Business Schools Librarian's Group
IESE Research Papers,
IESE Business School
No D/556: Corporate governance and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation
Antonio Davila and Fernando Peñalva ()
Additional contact information
Antonio Davila: Stanford University
Fernando Peñalva: IESE Business School, Postal: Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN
Abstract: We empirically examine how corporate governance affects the structure of executive compensation contracts. In particular, we analyze the implicit weights of firm performance measures in explaining CEO compensation. We find that weaker corporate governance is associated with compensation contracts that put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (i.e., return on assets) than on stock-based performance measures (i.e., market returns). This finding is consistent with CEOs in firms with weaker governance structures -where the CEO has more influence over the contracting process- choosing to weight more heavily those performance measures that they are better able to control. To further examine the implications of these results, we investigate the association between variation in compensation and governance and find that weaker governance is associated with lower variance in compensation. We also find that executive compensation contracts in firms with weaker governance rely more on cash compensation at the expense of stock-based compensation.
Keywords: corporate governance; executive compensation; compensation contracts design
28 pages, May 19, 2004
Full text files
DI-0556-E.pdf
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Noelia Romero ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
This page generated on 2024-02-05 15:47:28.