European Business Schools Librarian's Group

IESE Research Papers,
IESE Business School

No D/619: Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games

Xavier Vives ()
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Xavier Vives: IESE Business School, Postal: Research Division, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN

Abstract: We provide sufficient conditions in finite-horizon multi-stage games for the value function of each player, associated to extremal Markov perfect equilibria, to display strategic complementarities and for the contemporaneous equilibrium to be increasing in the state variables.

Keywords: Markov game; supermodularity; two-stage game; adjustment costs; learning curve; network effects

27 pages, March 21, 2006

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