IESE Research Papers
No D/622:
The economics of IPR protection policies
Ricard Gil ()
Abstract: In this paper, we model competition between legal and
pirate products. In our framework, the government affects this competition
through police spending and taxes on legal products. Therefore, the
government can choose the combination of spending and taxes that best fits
its goals. We find that governments that focus entirely on eradicating
piracy use lower levels of taxes and police spending than governments that
focus on maximizing consumption, consumer surplus, welfare or government
size. This result highlights the importance of demand side policies in the
fight against piracy and posts a challenge to the traditional solo approach
of supply side policies.
Keywords: piracy; pirate products; intellectual property rights; illegal copying; demand side policies; (follow links to similar papers)
23 pages, March 3, 2006
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