Heiko Gerlach ()
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Heiko Gerlach: University of Auckland
Abstract: I examine the incentives of firms to communicate entry into an industry where the incumbent writes exclusionary, long-term contracts with consumers. The entrant's information provision affects the optimal contract proposal by the incumbent and leads to communication incentives that are highly non-linear in the size of the innovation. Entry with small and medium-to-large innovations is announced whereas small-to-medium and large innovations are not communicated. It is demonstrated that this equilibrium communication behavior maximizes ex ante total welfare by reducing the anti-competitive impact of excessively exclusive contracts. By contrast, consumers always prefer more communication and the incumbent's equilibrium contract maximizes ex ante consumer surplus.
Keywords: Long-term contracts; communication; contractual switching costs; exclusionary conduct
34 pages, May 15, 2007
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