Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
No 1017:
Venture Capital Contracts: A survey of the recent literature
Andrea Schertler
Abstract: This paper surveys empirical and theoretical studies of
various control mechanisms embedded in venture capital contracts. These
mechanisms mitigate incentive problems and opportunistic behavior arising
in the uncertain environment of financing young high-technology enterprises
that predominantly invest in intangible assets. In particular, the paper
discusses the entrepreneurs compensation, the type of financing, the
staging of capital infusions, and various control rights explicitly given
to venture capitalists. While theoretical studies explain some of the
mechanisms empirically observed, others and the combinations of control
mechanisms often used are still unexplained.
Keywords: venture capital contracts, stage financing, convertible securities, entrepreneurs compensation; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D82; G24; G32; L14; (follow links to similar papers)
25 pages, December 2000
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
copyright.
Download GhostScript
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Downloadable files:
kap1017.pdf 
Download Statistics
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Programing by
Design Joakim Ekebom
