Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
No 1376:
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
Tibor Neugebauer, Javier Perote, Ulrich Schmidt and Malte Loos
Abstract: In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put
forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public
good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate
these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a
variation of information feedback and an elicitation of individual beliefs
about others’ contributions. Altogether, our data support the hypothesis of
conditional cooperation with a selfish bias.
Keywords: experimental economics, information feedback, public goods, voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C72,; C92,; H41; (follow links to similar papers)
20 pages, September 2007
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