Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
How Global Rules are established and stabilized
Abstract: This paper analyzes how international rules are
established and stabilized, i.e. how an international institutional order
develops. Rules emerge mainly through learning from negative experience and
serve to reduce transaction costs. The paper looks at mechanisms that
stabilize rule systems, at bargaining procedures for cooperation gains,
dispute settlement, sanctions, side payments, self-enforcing contracts,
waivers and regional integrations within a multilateral order. In addition
it analyzes the prevention of negative spillovers, international courts and
global public goods.
Keywords: International rules, transaction costs, institutional competition, gains from cooperation, bargaining for cooperation gains, positive mechanisms, dispute settlement, sanctions, side payments, self-enforcing contracts, negative spillovers, international courts, global public goods; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: A12,; F02,; F15,; K00,; N00,; P00; (follow links to similar papers)
36 pages, December 2007
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