Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
No 1533:
Unordnung in der Internationalen Handelsordnung. Befunde, Gründe, Auswirkungen und Therapien
Rolf J. Langhammer
Abstract: In the past, many WTO member states have liberalized their
trade policies unilaterally. However, they were decreasingly prepared to
guarantee these measures multilaterally, that is to "bind" them. This paper
analyzes the background of this development by resorting to three political
economy arguments pro multilateral binding: the terms of trade externality
argument, the "tying hand" argument, that is to protect a government which
is prone to liberalize against domestic lobby groups, and finally the
argument that trade policies are instruments for general political targets.
For all three arguments, it is shown why an important driving force of
mercantilistically motivated trade negotiations has become weaker, the
reciprocity requirement. The paper recommends narrower negotiation issues
and mandates to prevent a further rising heterogeneity of issues and
negotiation partners
Keywords: International Trading Order, Multilateral Trading Negotiations, Reciprocity; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: F13; (follow links to similar papers)
31 pages, July 2009
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