Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
No 1695:
Whom to Send to Doha? The Shortsighted Ones!
Mario Larch , and Wolfgang Lechthaler
Abstract: Why are empirically observed tariffs so much lower than
theoretically calculated Nash-equilibrium tariffs? We argue that this gap
can be narrowed by using a dynamic model instead of a static model. This
approach has two advantages. (i) It allows us to take account of the
transitional process after a change in tariffs. (ii) It allows us to take
account of the shortsightedness of policy makers. We show that
Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a dynamic trade model are lower than
Nash-equilibrium tariffs based on a static model. We also show that
shortsighted politicians tend to set lower tariffs than politicians with a
long planning horizon
Keywords: Bubbles, fiscal theory of the price level, collateral constraints, neutrality, transversality conditions; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: F11,; F12,; F13; (follow links to similar papers)
25 pages, April 2011
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