Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for World Economics
No 947:
Complementarities in Corporate Governance. A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan
Ralph P. Heinrich
Abstract: The present paper uses a comparison of Japan and the US to
argue that the debate about corporate governance reform is best framed in
terms of systems of complementary instruments and institutions. It argues
that the Japanese and US systems of corporate governance differ along many
dimensions, yet can both be understood as efficient combinations of
complementary instruments adapted to a particular institutional and
regulatory environment. The paper also shows how exogenous shocks and
piecemeal regulatory reforms have undermined the internal consistency of
the Japanese system in the recent past.
Keywords: Corporate governance, Complementarity, Agency problem, Japan; (follow links to similar papers)
61 pages, September 1999
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