Working papers, Department of Economics, WU (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien)
Is Wage-Leadership an Instrument to Coordinate Union's Wage-Policy? The Case of Imperfect Product Markets,
Abstract: Given an oligopolistic product market, trade unions
organized at firm level want to coordinate their wage bargaining
activities, even if they are self interested. In this paper a situation is
analysed, where for some exogenous reasons a complete centralization is not
possible. Unions could try to coordinate wage-setting by ''wage
leadership''. The outcome of such ''wage leadership'' is compared with the
outcome of an uncoordinated bargaining and results in higher utilities for
all unions. But the resulting wages and employment levels are not
symmetrically neither for the unions nor for firms. Employment levels will
change in different directions. In the ''wage leader'' firm employment
falls and in the ''follower'' firm employment rises compared to an
uncoordinated wage bargaining. This may cause problems with the
implementation of ''wage leadership''
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design Joakim Ekebom