Working papers, Department of Economics, WU (Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien)
Detecting Collusion in Spatially Differentiated Markets
() and Agnes Kügler
Abstract: The empirical literature on mergers, market power and
collusion in differentiated markets has mainly focused on methods relying
on output and/or panel data. In contrast to this literature we suggest a
novel approach that allows for the detection of collusive behavior among a
group of firms making use of information on the spatial structure of
horizontally differentiated products. By estimating best response functions
using a spatial econometrics approach, we focus on differences in the
strategic interaction in pricing between different groups of firms as well
as on differences in price levels. We apply our method to the market for
ski lift tickets using a unique data set on ticket prices and detailed
resort-specific characteristics covering all ski resorts in Austria.
Keywords: tacit collusion, strategic alliances, spatial differentiation, ski lift ticket prices; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C21,; D43,; L11,; L41,; L83,; R32; (follow links to similar papers)
Before downloading any of the electronic versions below
you should read our statement on
for viewing Postscript files and the
Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ()
or Helena Lundin ().
Design Joakim Ekebom