Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris
Random walks and voting theory
Abstract: Voters' preferences depend on the available information.
Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is
processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from
the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a
winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random
Keywords: voting theory; quotas; random walks; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: D72; D80; (follow links to similar papers)
20 pages, May 1, 2002
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