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No 818:
Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models

Hervé Crès () and Utku Ünver

Abstract: When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the "worst-case" scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1-1/n is adopted. In this paper the authors assume that a lower d-dimensional (d<n)linear map spans the possible candidates plateforms. These d "ideological" dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. The authors randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to infinity.Moreover the equilibrium is the mean voter. The speed of convergence (toward 50%)of the super majority rate guaranteeing existence of equilibrium is computed for d= 1 and 2.

Keywords: spatial voting; super majority; ideology; mean voter theorem; random point set; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: C62; D72; (follow links to similar papers)

23 pages, February 6, 2006

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