Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris
Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models
() and Utku Ünver
Abstract: When aggregating individual preferences through the
majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the "worst-case"
scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium
exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1-1/n is adopted. In this
paper the authors assume that a lower d-dimensional (d<n)linear map spans
the possible candidates plateforms. These d "ideological" dimensions imply
some linkages between the n political issues. The authors randomize over
these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a50%-majority
equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to
infinity.Moreover the equilibrium is the mean voter. The speed of
convergence (toward 50%)of the super majority rate guaranteeing existence
of equilibrium is computed for d= 1 and 2.
Keywords: spatial voting; super majority; ideology; mean voter theorem; random point set; (follow links to similar papers)
JEL-Codes: C62; D72; (follow links to similar papers)
23 pages, February 6, 2006
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