European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Home About Series Subject/JEL codes Advanced Search
HEC Paris. Research Department Les Cahiers de Recherche - HEC Paris

No 954:
Approval voting and arrow's impossibility theorem

Philippe Mongin () and François Maniquet

Abstract: Author's abstract. Approval voting has attracted considerable interest among voting theorists, but they have rarely investigated it in the Arrovian frame-work of social welfare functions (SWF) and never connected it with Arrow’s impossibility theorem. This note explores these two direc- tions. Assuming that voters have dichotomous preferences, it first characterizes approval voting in terms of its SWF properties and then shows that these properties are incompatible if the social preference is also taken to be dichotomous. The positive result improves on some existing characterizations of approval voting in the literature, as well as on Arrow’s and May’s classic analyses of voting on two alternatives. The negative result corresponds to a novel and perhaps surprising version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.

Keywords: approval voting; majority voting; collective prefer- ence function; arrow’s impossibility theorem.; (follow links to similar papers)

JEL-Codes: D71; (follow links to similar papers)

16 pages, November 17, 2011

Before downloading any of the electronic versions below you should read our statement on copyright.
Download GhostScript for viewing Postscript files and the Acrobat Reader for viewing and printing pdf files.

Full text versions of the paper:

CR954_Mongin%2C_Maniquet.pdf    PDF-file
Download Statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Sandra Dupouy ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson () or Helena Lundin ().

Programing by
Design Joakim Ekebom

Handle: RePEc:ebg:heccah:0954 This page was generated on 2014-12-14 17:56:25