Anders Poulsen ()
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Anders Poulsen: Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, Postal: Prismet, Silkeborgvej 2, DK 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Abstract: This paper analyses preference evolution in a bargaining situation. We show
that preferences for reciprocity, that sustain a conflict-free outcome, are viable
if players have enough information about opponents’ preferences. However, depending
on the initial starting point, preference evolution can in general both
enhance or reduce subjective and material welfare, relative to the situation where
all players have the usual materialistic preferences.
Keywords: Preference evolution; Reciprocity; Altruism; Materialism; Subjective and material eciency; Bargaining; Indirect evolutionary approach
18 pages, March 19, 2001
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01-3_ap.pdf
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