Working Papers,
University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the timing of promotions in academic departments. Contrary to previous attempts in the empirical literature, we test

alternative theories of fast tracks by adding a measure of performance in

our analysis. We find that learning from past performance is an important

factor to explain the time spent as assistant and associate professor. In

addition, our analysis shows the existence of a handicapping policy: individuals who had a fast promotion in the past are less likely to be promoted

quickly again. We also find that the handicap is relative, that it does not

survive the whole career and that it is possible for these individuals to

beat it if they achieve a given level of productivity. We interpret our find-

ings as evidence that incentives and sorting matter in academia and that

using relative handicaps can help to balance these two concerns. Finally,

we look at the productivity pattern of individuals with different career

profiles and find that fast tracks are always more productive than their

pairs, even after the last promotion, what suggests an effective selection

process.

Keywords: Fast track; Incentives; Sorting; Productivity; Economic departments

JEL-codes: J41; M51

28 pages, May 26, 2004

Full text files

04-4_vas.pdf  

Download statistics

• University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics
• Home page for this series

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Helle Vinbaek Stenholt ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:hhs:aareco:2004_004This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:19:12.