European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Working Papers,
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
No 11-1999: POLITICAL OWNERSHIP
Morten Bennedsen
Additional contact information
Morten Bennedsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: Political involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders`lobby activities distorts resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labor allocation is improved when cash flow is rights affects efficiency in resource allocation when there are restrictions on side payments between the interest groups.
Keywords: Ownership Structure; Influence Externality; Side Payments; resource Allocation
JEL-codes: D21; D23; D78; H11; L33
32 pages, July 18, 1999
Full text files
7563
- Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
- Ordering Working Papers
- Home page for this series
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lars Nondal ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:1999_011This page generated on 2024-12-21 04:36:09.