Peter Møllegaard and Jochen Lorentzen
Additional contact information
Peter Møllegaard: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Jochen Lorentzen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy
harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we
compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in
Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate
countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the
candidates. Finally, we use insights from case studies of subcontractor agreements in
the Eastern Europe. to highlight instances of non-conformity between (1) East European
competition law and practice and (2) EU rules and East European competition law
enforcement. Our conclusion targets an underdeveloped competition culture as
primary culprit for limits to effective – as opposed to merely legal – harmonisation of
competition policy in the run-up to EU enlargement.
Keywords: competition policy; EU; Eastern Europe
24 pages, May 17, 2001
Full text files
wpec052001.pdf
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lars Nondal ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2000_005This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:19:22.