European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Working Papers,
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
No 13-2000: IS UNEMPLOYMENT ALWAYS HIGHER WHEN INSIDERS DECIDE?
Trine Filges and Birthe Larsen
Additional contact information
Trine Filges: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Birthe Larsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: This paper challenges the traditional view that unemployment is high because insiders determine the union wage. The insiders in this paper are characterized by being more efficient when they search for a job than the outsiders, implying that they experience relatively less unemployment. We assume that wages are determined by a monopoly union and further that a union leader is elected by a majority voting rule. Insiders may prefer a lower wage than outsiders, implying the possibility of lower unemployment.
Keywords: Insiders and Outsiders; Search; Unemployment
24 pages, April 1, 2000
Full text files
x648078301.pdf
- Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
- Ordering Working Papers
- Home page for this series
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lars Nondal ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2000_013This page generated on 2024-12-21 04:36:09.