European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Working Papers,
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
No 15-2000: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION IN CORPORATIONS WITH CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
Morten Bennedsen and Daniel Wolfenzon
Additional contact information
Morten Bennedsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Daniel Wolfenzon: Michigan Business School, Postal: Chicago Business School
Abstract: We provide a theoretical analysis of the relationship between investor protection and the performance of corporations with concentrated ownership and apply it to analyze two types of investor protection. First, we analyze the cost and benefits of imposing super-majority requirements on certain important policy issues in the corporation. Second, we analyze why it can be in the interest of the corporation to impose restrictions on the free transferability of shares.
Keywords: Investor protection; Concentrated ownership; Corporate performance
JEL-codes: G31
28 pages, December 1, 2000
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