Jochen Lorentzen and Peter Møllgaard
Additional contact information
Jochen Lorentzen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Peter Møllgaard: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy
harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we
compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in
Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate
countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the
candidates. Finally, we examine a large database of inter-firm agreements in Eastern
Europe’s car industry and use insights from case studies of subcontracting to highlight
instances of non-conformity between (1) East European competition law and practice
and (2) EU rules and East European competition law enforcement. The conclusion
recommends how to improve competition policy practice, and thus compliance, postenlargement.
Keywords: Competition policy; vertical restraints; vertical agreements; Eastern Europe; EU harmonisation; subcontracting; competition law
JEL-codes: D40; G18; K00; K12; L14; L42
15 pages, September 1, 2002
Full text files
7576
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lars Nondal ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2002_011This page generated on 2024-09-13 22:19:22.