European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Working Papers,
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
No 06-2004: Non-Preferential Trading Clubs
Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Alan D. Woodland
Additional contact information
Pascalis Raimondos-Møller: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Alan D. Woodland: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare.
Keywords: Trading clubs; non-preferential tariff reform; Kemp-Wan-Ohyama proposition
JEL-codes: F15
29 pages, August 28, 2006
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