European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Working Papers,
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
No 07-2007: Self-Selection and Advise in Venture Capital Finance
Christian Keuschnigg and Søren Bo Nielsen
Additional contact information
Christian Keuschnigg: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Søren Bo Nielsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: In financing start-up firms, venture capitalists carefully select among alternative projects, design incentive compatible financial contracts and support portfolio companies with value enhancing managerial advice. This paper considers how venture capitalists can induce self-selection among entrepreneurial firms with different qualities by designing appropriate contracts and offering commercial support. We study the efficiency of the competitive market equilibrium with respect to the level and quality of entrepreneurship and the level of effort by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. We also provide comparative statics results with respect to basic preference and technology parameters. Venture capital, entrepreneurship, self-selection, moral hazard.
Keywords: na
JEL-codes: G24
28 pages, January 1, 2008
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