European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Working Papers,
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
No 02-2008: Equilibrium Selection with Risk Dominance in a Multiple-unit Unit Price Auction
Anette Boom
Additional contact information
Anette Boom: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing procedure, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to discriminate between two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of the same type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit price auction where two sellers compete in order to serve a fixed demand. The equilibria where the firm with the larger capacity bids the maximum price, serves the residual demand and is undercut by the low capacity firm that sells its total capacity risk dominate the equilibria where the roles are interchanged.
Keywords: na
JEL-codes: G10
12 pages, January 1, 2008
Full text files
7664
- Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
- Ordering Working Papers
- Home page for this series
Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Lars Nondal ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().
RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2008_002This page generated on 2024-12-21 04:36:11.