European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Working Papers,
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
No 06-2008: Mixed R&D incentives: the effect of R&D subsidies on patented inventions
Cedric Schneider
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Cedric Schneider: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of mixed public-private R&D incentives and empirically tests whether patents that were publicly sponsored are more important than non-subsidized ones. Blending patents and public subsidies will allow the funding agency to subsidize inventions that would otherwise not elicit investment because the private incentive will not fully cover the cost of the invention. Thus, the policy maker will only subsidize inventions that have a high social value. The empirical analysis shows that subsidized inventions result in more important patents, as measured by the number of forward citations.
Keywords: na
JEL-codes: G10
21 pages, January 1, 2008
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