European Business Schools Librarian's Group
Working Papers,
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
No 17-2020: Equilibrium Arrivals to a Last-come First-served Preemptive-resume Queue
Jesper Breinbjerg, Trine Tornøe Platz () and Lars Peter Østerdal ()
Additional contact information
Jesper Breinbjerg: Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Postal: Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M.
Trine Tornøe Platz: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, Porcelaenshaven 16 A. 1. floor, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark, , Present address: Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Ro-, lighedsvej 25, DK- 1958 Frederiksberg C.
Lars Peter Østerdal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, Porcelaenshaven 16 A. 1. floor, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Abstract: We consider a queueing system where a single server opens and serves users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). A finite number of strategic users must choose individually when to arrive at the server. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. Based on the constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium, we provide a numerical example in which we compute the symmetric equilibrium strategy and compare the resulting social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.
Keywords: Queueing; Strategic arrivals; Nash equilibrium; LCFS-PR; FCFS
31 pages, October 2, 2020
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