European Business Schools Librarian's Group

ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

No DR 03013: Environmental Games and Queue Models

Charles Tapiero ()
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Charles Tapiero: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P.105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE CEDEX , FRANCE,

Abstract: This paper considers a pollution and control game which uses a queuing framework. This framework allows an accounting of pollution events, environmental pollution quality and the application of controls to maintain a desirable quality of the environment. A number of examples are used to highlight the approach and demonstrates both its theoretical and practical usefulness.

Keywords: Environment; Control; Quality; Queuing

JEL-codes: C73; Q21; Q26

30 pages, November 2003

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