European Business Schools Librarian's Group

ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

No DR 03006: Conflit d'intérêt économique entre avocats et clients : la questions des honoraires

Alain Lempereur () and Mathieu Scodellaro
Additional contact information
Alain Lempereur: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE CEDEX , FRANCE
Mathieu Scodellaro: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE CEDEX , FRANCE

Abstract: In the line of the agency question, the lawyer/client relationship cannot escape the risk of conflict of interests. This text broadly redefines the nature of this conflict, and links it to an important source of tension, i.e. fees. We study three types of billing : contingency fees, hourly, and alternative billing. Besides billing structures, we examine their influence on this latent conflict, and propose a few ways of managing and preventing tensions.

Keywords: Agency question; Principal/agent tension; Lawyer; Conflict of interests; Tension management; Billing structure; Contingency fees; Hourly billing; Alternative billing

JEL-codes: D74; E24; K41

30 pages, March 2003

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