European Business Schools Librarian's Group
ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School
No DR 06003: Can Incentives for Research Harm Research? A Business Schools Tale
Damien Besancenot () and Radu Vranceanu ()
Additional contact information
Damien Besancenot: LEM and Université Paris 2, Postal: 92 rue d’Assas, 75006 PARIS, FRANCE
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE CEDEX , FRANCE
Abstract: The paper develops a simple model of the market for academic publications in business and economics. The supply of papers is presented as the outcome of a game between researchers and schools’ deans under imperfect information about the quality of a given paper. The demand for papers brings into the picture the editorial selection process. After defining the equilibrium of this market, the model allows us to study the consequences of more powerful incentives for publication in major journals. It turns out that too large bonuses, as implemented by business schools in the recent years, might bring about several unpleasant consequences, as a drop in the quality of major journals, a decline in the number of top-tier publications realized by leading research institutions and a fall in the expected compensation of top researchers.
Keywords: Academic Journals; Business Schools; Incentives for Publishing; Publications Market; Rankings
29 pages, February 2006
Full text files
Dr06003.pdf
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