European Business Schools Librarian's Group

ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

No DR 06017: Preferencing, internalization and inventory position

Laurence Lescourret () and Christian Y. Robert ()
Additional contact information
Laurence Lescourret: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex , FRANCE,
Christian Y. Robert: Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration Economique (ENSAE), Postal: 15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri, 92245 MALAKOFF, FRANCE

Abstract: We present a model of market-making in which dealers differ by their current inventory positions and by their preferencing agreements. Under preferencing, dealers receive captive orders that they guarantee to execute at the best price. We show that preferencing raises the inventory holding costs of preferenced dealers. In turn, competitors post less aggressive quotes. Since price-competition is softened, expected spreads widen. The entry of unpreferenced dealers, or the ability to route preferenced orders to best-quoting dealers, as internalization does restore price competitiveness. We also show that a greater transparency may negatively affect expected spreads, depending on the scale of preferencing.

Keywords: Internalization; Inventory Control; Market Microstructure; Preferencing; Transparency

JEL-codes: D43; L21

49 pages, November 2006

Full text files 

showDeclFileRes.do?declId=6628&key=__workpaper__ PDF-file

Download statistics

Questions (including download problems) about the papers in this series should be directed to Sophie Magnanou ()
Report other problems with accessing this service to Sune Karlsson ().

RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-06017This page generated on 2024-10-19 15:41:33.