Damien Besancenot (), Joao Ricardo Faria () and Radu Vranceanu ()
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Damien Besancenot: Université Paris 13 and CEPN (Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord), Postal: 99, av. Jean-Baptiste Clément, 93430 Villetaneuse ,
Joao Ricardo Faria: Nottingham Business School, Postal: Burton St., Nottingham NG1 4BU, UK
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex , FRANCE, ,
Abstract: Criticism is mounting on business schools for their excessive focus on research and for neglecting teaching. We show that if students have imperfect information about a school’s overall capabilities and if business schools differ in their research productivity, the least productive schools may do as much research as the top-tier ones only to manipulate student’s expectations. In turn, the most productive schools might resort to excess research in order to signal their type in the eyes of future students. This signalling equilibrium is characterized by a relative neglect of teaching by the top-tier schools. Such a situation is socially inefficient as compared to the perfect information case.
Keywords: Business Schools; Research management; Research policy; Research vs. teaching; Signalling; Imperfect information
19 pages, January 2008
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