European Business Schools Librarian's Group

ESSEC Working Papers,
ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School

No DR 08017: Migratory policy in developing countries: how to bring best people back?

Damien Besancenot () and Radu Vranceanu ()
Additional contact information
Damien Besancenot: CEPN and University Paris 13, Postal: 99, av.Jean-Baptiste Clément , 93430 Villetaneuse , FRANCE
Radu Vranceanu: ESSEC Business School, Postal: Avenue Bernard Hirsch - B.P. 50105, 95021 CERGY-PONTOISE Cedex , FRANCE,

Abstract: This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model with exogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and good workers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers. Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to the perfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher the incentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow

Keywords: Temporary Migration; Return Migrants; Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium; Signalling Model

JEL-codes: D82; F22; J61

26 pages, November 2008

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